N. 85 July 2025 | Reactivating the Franco-German Engine

With the election of Friedrich Merz as Chancellor and the confirmed leadership of Emmanuel Macron for the next two years, Germany and France finally seem ready – after a long hiatus – to relaunch the European integration process. In a context marked by the progressive disengagement of the United States and the growing threat posed by Russia, the two leading European countries are positioning themselves to lead the Union at a highly dangerous moment, when the security and future of democracy on the continent are seriously threatened by both internal and external enemies.

Following his electoral victory in February, Merz broke several taboos of German public opinion: through a constitutional reform shared with the SPD and the Greens, he managed to override the debt brake to invest – also in deficit spending – in the military and infrastructure, and he reignited the urgency for strategic European autonomy, free from American protection. He also reopened the debate, already initiated by Macron, on extending France’s nuclear umbrella to Germany and the EU in case the credibility of U.S. deterrence wanes. These ideas, once considered radical, are now gaining broader support among other European countries, including the Baltics, Scandinavians, and Poland. These positions emerge at a time when Germany’s political-economic situation is particularly fragile: declining industrial production and rising unemployment are eroding citizens’ trust, especially in the former East Germany, where inequalities remain stark.

In this climate, the rise of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a populist and nationalist party, continues. It came second in the elections and now leads in the polls. Its success signals a deep crisis in traditional parties. Support from figures such as Elon Musk and members of the Trump administration has increased its international visibility, alarming German intelligence services, which have labeled it a threat to democracy and incompatible with constitutional values.

France, for its part, is also experiencing an unstable phase. Prime Minister François Bayrou maintains a fragile balance between the left, center, and far right. Despite a recent conviction for misuse of EU funds, Marine Le Pen and her party remain favorites for the 2027 presidential elections. Approaching the end of his final term, Emmanuel Macron is attempting to revitalize France’s role in Europe, focusing on issues such as the digitalization of the economy and the creation of a European defense independent from the USA.

He also proposed a “coalition of the willing” to ensure stability in Ukraine in the event of a truce, with French and British troops deployed on the ground. While the initiative is framed in an intergovernmental context, it may still serve the development of a common defense, as it expresses the will of certain European countries to continue supporting Kyiv’s resistance regardless of U.S. decisions. Clearly, the risks and opportunities facing the French and German governments are closely tied to the direction the European integration process will take.

Competing with the major American and Chinese industrial and tech giants, dealing with trade wars, and building credible deterrence against potential Russian attacks are challenges no single member state – not even France or Germany – can face alone. Yet these efforts are essential to provide concrete and effective responses to European citizens’ demands, to contain the arrogance of neo-imperial powers on the international stage, and to disarm the populist rhetoric of sovereignist and anti-democratic forces. In this light, it is vital that Paris and Berlin achieve full alignment on strategic proposals to ambitiously relaunch European integration.

In the short term, the two governments should promote concrete initiatives to strengthen European defense integration. A dialogue is already underway to enhance EU defense funding, potentially supported by large-scale joint debt issuance. Both governments have also expressed support for the introduction of qualified majority voting in the Council for foreign policy matters, aiming to make the EU’s external action more effective and coherent.

Another topic arising in the ongoing dialogue between Paris and Berlin concerns reforming France’s nuclear doctrine, with the intention of extending its scope to Germany and, potentially, the entire EU. The current EU treaties already allow some of these measures to be adopted through unanimous decisions in the Council or European Council. However, should one or more member states oppose – an outcome that is likely- France and Germany should consider bypassing the unanimity requirement by proposing a new activation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) under Article 46 of the Treaty on European Union. This initiative would enable a group of willing and capable member states to advance toward building an autonomous European defense, potentially supported by ad hoc intergovernmental mechanisms open only to countries wishing to participate.

While the sharing of resources and convergence of foreign policy priorities should be implemented as soon as possible, it is also essential that Paris and Berlin lead the push for a deep revision of the EU treaties. It is significant in this regard that President Macron has repeatedly reaffirmed his support for institutional reform of the Union, having been the main promoter of the Conference on the Future of Europe, and that the Merz government has clearly committed in its program to treaty reform and strengthening EU institutions.

This initiative should start from the reform project approved by the European Parliament in November 2023, based on the results of the Conference on the Future of Europe. 

Among the main proposals to be prioritized in the reform are: 

• The extension of qualified majority voting to all common policies, particularly in foreign and defense policy.
• The introduction of a European fiscal capacity and a common budget funded by own resources decided through the ordinary legislative procedure.
• Strengthening the role of the European Parliament and the Commission as representative and supranational institutions. 

It is crucial that the new Treaty can enter into force among the countries that ratify it, even in the absence of unanimity, following a multi-speed integration model. This would ensure greater flexibility and allow the more ambitious countries to move forward without being held hostage by individual national vetoes.

Ultimately, a rare window of political opportunity is opening: if the governments of Paris and Berlin manage to consolidate their strategic convergence, they could mark a historic turning point for the European project, laying the foundations for a more sovereign Union, while also saving their countries from possible populist and anti-democratic backsliding.