N. 88 January 2026 | Only Europe Can Save Itself

Donald Trump’s return to the White House has marked a radical upheaval of the global order. The new U.S. administration displays systematic contempt for international law and multilateral organizations, elevating unilateralism and the use of force to ordinary instruments of a foreign policy inspired by the ideology of “America First.” The reckless use of military power to impose national interests — evident in the bombings against Iran, in threats directed at Mexico, Colombia, and Panama, and above all in the sensational attack on Venezuela, culminating in the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and his deportation to the United States — represents a brutal assertion of power politics. Politically, this marks the end of the multilateral order of which the United States had been the principal guarantor, opening a new historical phase characterized by the systematic return of force in international relations and the progressive division of the world into opposing spheres of influence. In this context, Washington’s initiatives end up legitimizing and strengthening the imperial ambitions of other global actors: from Xi Jinping’s China, increasingly assertive over Taiwan, to Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which finds renewed justification for its war of conquest in Ukraine.

This dramatic acceleration of history has the European Union itself as its main victim. The EU had flourished within a multilateral order based on shared rules and common institutions, developing its international projection through the tools of soft law, international cooperation, and trade. Today, however, lacking the attributes of statehood, the Union struggles to manage the abrupt return of power politics, which its now former American ally is using ruthlessly precisely against it. Not only has the Trump administration launched a trade war against the Old Continent — currently taking the form of the unilateral imposition of 15% tariffs on European products — but it is also pursuing a genuine strategy of destabilization vis-à-vis the European Union.

Consider first the United States’ stance toward the war in Ukraine. Trump has decreed a substantial disengagement, cutting off U.S. funding for Kyiv’s resistance. American weapons, on which the Ukrainian army continues to depend, must now be purchased by Europeans, while the support provided by U.S. satellites and intelligence appears increasingly precarious. Even more serious has been Washington’s shameful rapprochement with Russia. Beginning with the Anchorage meeting, Trump has effectively become the spokesperson for the Kremlin’s demands: Zelensky should accept Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donbas, with the consequent cession of territories — both occupied and unoccupied — and a drastic reduction of Kyiv’s armed forces, in exchange for vague and non-credible security guarantees against future aggression.

The second attack on Europe was set down in black and white in the National Security Strategy (NSS), signed by President Trump at the end of November. This document evokes the imminent disappearance of European civilization as a result both of the “activities of the EU that undermine political freedom and sovereignty” and of “migration policies that are transforming the continent.” The European Union is no longer described as an ally, but is openly portrayed as an enemy. For this reason, the U.S. administration intends to actively support extremist and anti-European forces, which are depicted as the only “salvation” of European civilization. Trump’s objective is evidently to bring to power in Europe political forces that are compliant and willing to accept full vassalage to Washington.

A third, and in some respects even more serious, threat to the European Union is represented by Trump’s claims over Greenland. The U.S. demand to exercise direct control over a territory belonging to an EU Member State — Denmark — introduces an unprecedented element of destabilization in transatlantic relations. Trump’s threats to “take” Greenland by fair means or foul, that is, through the use of force against a historic ally, effectively mark the end of the Atlantic alliance. The latter now appears as an empty shell, within which Europeans are forced to adopt purely tactical positions in an attempt to contain and manage the new and unexpected danger coming from the West.

At this crucial juncture in history, the future of the Union — and of democratic forces themselves — appears increasingly tied to how Europeans respond to two challenges: containing the most aggressive and destabilizing tendencies of the U.S. administration and preventing Putin’s victory in the conflict in Ukraine.

With regard to the United States, it is essential that the European Union stand as a guarantor of those fundamental values — the rule of law, democracy, and multilateralism — that the Trump administration appears increasingly determined to trample. As for Greenland, Europeans must make it unequivocally clear that any attempt to alter its status through pressure, coercion, or the use of force would constitute an aggression against a Member State, thereby triggering the obligation of collective defense under Article 42(7) TEU. The possible establishment, at Denmark’s request, of a European deterrent presence in Greenland could increase the political cost of any hostile action and concretely demonstrate Europe’s willingness to defend its Member States. At the same time, the Union must adopt decisive initiatives to counter any form of interference by the U.S. administration in favor of anti-European forces, for example by fully implementing digital legislation and strengthening rules on political advertising. Finally, it is of crucial importance that Europe continue to promote international cooperation and open trade, also with a view to diversifying its exports and imports and reducing strategic dependencies on the United States. In this sense, the approval of the agreement with Mercosur represents positive news. 

An even more decisive front for Europe’s future remains the conflict in Ukraine, whose outcome remains extremely uncertain. If the Union and the European states are able to support Kyiv’s resistance by all means, preventing it from being forced into surrender, Europe will provide an extraordinary demonstration of political self-determination and it will be possible to relaunch the integration process. If, on the other hand, Putin were to prevail, thanks to Trump’s support, the security of the continent would be definitively compromised, along with prospects for integration, and new blood would be destined to flow across Europe as soon as Russia is ready to launch its next attack.

An important moment for understanding the possible developments of the Ukrainian conflict was marked by the last European Council in December. The central issue on the leaders’ table was the financing of Ukrainian resistance, whose resources are set to run out by March due to the end of U.S. support. The most advanced proposal, initially supported by Chancellor Merz, envisaged converting Russian assets frozen in Europe into guarantees for a “reparation loan” intended to cover a significant portion of Ukraine’s defense and reconstruction costs. This option would have made it possible to mobilize up to €200 billion and to send a clear message to Moscow and Washington regarding the Union’s determination to support Kyiv at all costs.

The proposal, however, ran up against the intergovernmental logic of the Council and was discarded due to the opposition of Belgium and the reservations of key countries such as Italy and France. The solution adopted was therefore a €90 billion loan for the 2026–2027 biennium, financed through new common debt guaranteed by the EU budget. The Russian assets, frozen for an indefinite period, may eventually be used in the future to repay the European debt. The new issuance of eurobonds was made possible thanks to the abstention of some Member States, including Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, which have nevertheless announced that they will not contribute to repayment. The outcome of the Council must be read ambivalently: it is essential that the Union continue to support Kyiv through common debt, but Ukrainian military expenditures — €53 billion in 2025 alone — will not be fully covered, also due to rising costs in the defense industry and enormous civilian expenditures. In the face of pressure from Putin, Trump, and sovereignist forces, Europe will therefore be called upon to further strengthen its support for Kyiv, rejecting any hypothesis of appeasement and demonstrating that on the battlefield Russia cannot win.

In this extremely dangerous context, in which Europeans are called upon to manage ever more serious and frequent crises, the need for a true political leap forward reasserts itself forcefully — that is, for the transformation of the Union in a federation. Two reform priorities stand out in particular. First, the development of a genuine Union competence in foreign and security policy, exercised through decisions taken by majority vote and no longer subject to the unanimity of the Member States. Second, the creation of an autonomous fiscal capacity for the Union, independent of national budgets, capable of making the use of common borrowing credible and sustainable, on which both the Union and Ukraine may increasingly depend in the near future.

For this reason, the decision of the European Parliament on 25 November to approve a resolution on the institutional aspects of the Draghi Report was particularly important, as it renews the call for Treaty reform already advanced in the previous legislature. Without institutional reforms, in fact, the competitiveness proposals contained in the Draghi and Letta reports cannot be fully implemented. In this way, the European Parliament has reopened the political debate on Treaty reform and on the need for the Union to become capable of responding effectively to the geopolitical, economic, and strategic challenges of the new world dominated by power politics. An important opportunity to accelerate this process of institutional reform could be the prospect of an accelerated accession of Ukraine to the Union, to be included among the conditions of a negotiated peace agreement with the participation of Kyiv and the EU institutions.

As the Manifesto “It’s time for a European Union Declaration of Independence”, promoted by the Action Committee for the United States of Europe (relaunched on 18 October 2025 at the Maison Jean Monnet, Houjarray / Bazoches-sur-Guyonne, France) and signed by many European figures including Josep Borrell, Domènec Ruiz Devesa, Danuta Hübner, Enrico Letta, Pascal Lamy, Guy Verhofstadt, Robert Menasse, Javier Cercas, Hans-Gert Pöttering, and many others, reminds us, the time has come for Europe to take its destiny into its own hands, concretely, by creating its own capacity for action and defense.

The European Letter, together with the Union of European Federalists (UEF), invites all those interested to endorse the Manifesto, which calls for the “creation of a renewed cross-partisan and inter-institutional pro-European coalition encompassing the most committed Member States in the European Council, the pro-European majority in the European and National Parliaments, the European Commission, and regional and local institutions, over and above the particular inertias of each institution, and the pro-European organised civil society. We call on them all to mobilize locally, nationally, and transnationally to support these requests for a more sovereign and democratic Union”. Click here to sign the document.