N. 87 November 2025 | Overcoming the Deadlock

In a world dominated by the logic of force and competition among great continental powers, the European Union remains trapped in its own impotence. The problem is still the same: Europe needs to act swiftly and unitedly, but it cannot. The crisis in Gaza is an emblematic case of this paralysis. While European squares were filled with indignation and demonstrations demanding action to protect civilians and stop Netanyahu’s government’s massacre, the Union has remained a spectator, divided between governments calling for sanctions against Israel and others limiting themselves to statements of condemnation. Europe’s voice, once again, has gone unheard. Paradoxically, a change in Gaza seems to come not thanks to Europe, but through Donald Trump — the very leader who, since the start of his second term, has granted Netanyahu the broadest freedom of military action. Today, driven by political calculation and the desire to leave a mark on history, Trump presents himself as mediator, imposing a ceasefire and promoting an international administration in the Gaza Strip.

Meanwhile, the European Union is beset by multiple internal and external crises. The Russian threat remains the most immediate. Attacks against Ukraine continue with growing violence, without any real will for a ceasefire emerging from Moscow, despite Putin’s promises to Trump during their meeting in Anchorage on 14 August. On the contrary, the Kremlin has extended the conflict to EU territory through a hybrid war made up of cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and repeated violations of European airspace by drones, particularly over airports in Denmark and Germany. Putin’s goal is clear: to test Europe’s capacity to react, inflict economic and psychological damage, and fuel tensions within a public opinion already polarized between those calling for firmness toward Moscow and those minimizing the threat, urging accommodation with Russia.

In this context, Europe is faced with its responsibilities and must make choices. Above all, it cannot abandon Kyiv. The collapse of Ukrainian resistance would open the way to new expansionist ambitions by the Kremlin, directed toward Moldova and the Baltic States, with potentially devastating consequences for European security. For this reason, Brussels has sought in recent months to keep Trump engaged in supporting Kyiv, despite his personal sympathy for the Russian leader. At the same time, the Union has sought to offset U.S. disengagement by directly purchasing American weapons for Ukrainian forces. Secondly, Europe must profoundly rethink its defense architecture, especially in light of growing U.S. disengagement from NATO. Something is moving: the European rearmament plan launched last March by the Commission foresees the issuance of €150 billion in new EU debt to finance joint arms purchases, strengthening cooperation and interoperability among national armed forces. The idea of a “drone wall,” recently proposed by the President of the European Commission to protect the Union’s borders from possible Russian incursions, is another step in the right direction, though still far from a genuine common defense strategy.

However, the political knot remains unresolved. Member States are unwilling to make significant concessions in governance: decisions on defense still require unanimity, and this rule paralyzes collective capacity, blocking any ambition for strategic autonomy. Added to this is the question of resources: the EU budget, already modest, cannot sustain a credible common defense policy. Only the strongest countries will be able to rearm, deepening internal disparities and undermining the Union’s political cohesion. The new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) presented by the Commission in July proved inadequate: the proposed budget increase, by a few decimals of GDP, appears paltry in the face of current challenges. Hence the impasse: while public opinion and many observers call for a qualitative leap in integration, the Union remains blocked by governments unwilling to invest political capital in relaunching the European projet.

The paralysis is particularly evident in the two countries that have historically driven integration: France and Germany. In France, the institutional crisis following the 2024 legislative elections has produced a fragmented National Assembly unable to form a stable majority. The government cannot pass the budget or define a coherent strategy. President Macron, who had made “European sovereignty” the cornerstone of his political vision, now appears weakened, while the rise of the Rassemblement National threatens to compromise France’s European vocation. In Germany, the grand coalition led by Friedrich Merz is focused on managing a stagnant economy and containing the far-right rise of AfD, now leading the polls. The chancellor’s European commitment remains cautious: Berlin has so far rejected the idea of new joint debt issuance and has reacted coolly to the Commission’s proposal for the 2028–2034 MFF.

We are now in a new phase of European integration, where Member States can no longer be the engine of progress but have become an obstacle. Trapped in their own crises, they lack the cohesion and capacity to lead the Union’s renewal. In this stalemate, it is therefore up to the European institutions — first and foremost the Parliament — to take responsibility for relaunching Europe’s political unification project. This means developing strategies and initiatives to progressively gain greater political autonomy from the Member States, in order to consolidate an as yet insufficient European sovereignty. In recent weeks, the European Parliament has approved by a large majority a resolution calling for a united response to Russian violations of European airspace, as well as the creation of a true European Defence Union based on shared command, logistics and intelligence structures capable of fully implementing the collective defence clause provided for in Article 42(7) TEU.

Continuing on this path, it is essential that the European Parliament make full use of the prerogatives granted to it by the Treaties, exercising, if necessary, its veto power over the adoption of the annual budget and the multiannual financial framework to secure two key demands. First, the next MFF must have an adequate size — at least 2% of EU GDP — to finance European public goods, starting with defence, competitiveness and environmental protection. Second, the European Council must convene a Convention to amend the Treaties under Article 48 TEU, as already requested by Parliament in its resolution of 22 November 2023. With the opening of institutional reform, Parliament must reaffirm several essential priorities, including ending unanimity voting in the Council and granting the Union a genuine fiscal capacity.